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JUST THE FACTS, MA'AM: SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE,
EVIDENTIARY HABITS,
AND THE REVISION OF TRUTH
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE*

I. MATTERS OF FACT
Sergeant Joe Friday, a no-nonsense kind of detective on the old
television series Dragnet, used to confront distraught women with the
clipped injunction: "Just the facts, ma'am." Everyone knew what he
meant. These "hysterical" women, privileging the expression of emotion
over the recitation of relevant detail, were not being good witnesses. They
confused what an event felt like with what it was; they wandered off the
point into a tangle of irrelevancies. They did not crisply present the sort
of evidence that would allow a conscientious detective like Sergeant Friday
to catch the criminal. In short, these women were not helpful to the law.

Though Sergeant Friday no longer barks commands at weeping
women on television, except in reruns, women's evidence is often still
suspect in law. The stories women tell in court, particularly in cases of
sexualized violence like rape, sexual harassment, incest, and woman
battering, are vulnerable to attack as unbelievable. Cases of sexualized

violence often evolve into a "he said, she said" battle of competing
narratives in which the "he," who is the defendant, wins by default simply

because the evidence is contested. Default rules about the burden of proof
* Arthur F. Thumau Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and

Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Jane
Bennett, Jerome Bruner, Sally Bums, Fernando Coronil, Peggy Davis, John Kitsuse,
Rick Lempert, Jack Meiland, Francois Rochat, Roger Rouse, Ted Sarbin, David Scobey,
Peter Seidman, Richard Sherwin, Julie Skurski, and Scott Styles as well as seminar
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and the benefit of the doubt resolve all divergent accounts in favor of the
accused when there are merely contested stories with no "hard" evidence

to compel choice between them. Though laws on the books look more
woman-friendly on issues of sexualized violence than they used to, women

do not always find that helpful laws produce victories for women. 1 The
worst of the overt sexism of the law may have been dismantled: gone, for
the most part, are corroboration requirements 2 and the unrestrained

admissibility of the woman's sexual history in rape trials; 3 the exemption

in rape law that says rape cannot happen within marriage;4 legal
1. Susan Estrich argues that the rape reform statutes did not accomplish as much as
feminists thought they would. Instead, acquaintance rape still is hard to prosecute. See
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 13, 80-81 (1987); see also Kim Lane Schoppele, The ReVision of Rape Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1095, 1097-98, 1102 (1987). In sexualharassment cases, judges have repeatedly found that the particular instances of alleged
abuse were not serious enough to warrant a successful claim of employment
discrimination. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding that the woman could not succeed in her sexual-harassment claim, despite
vigorous dissent arguing for a "reasonable woman" standard). In Britain, Parliament
passed a statute explicitly intended to allow women to get temporary restraining orders
(TROs) against their battering husbands, only to find that the courts interpreted men's
common-law rights of property in their homes as narrowing the effective range of cases
in which such TROs were obtainable to only those cases in which the woman alone
owned the house. See WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERs, How TO Do THINOs wITH
RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION 356-73 (3d ed. 1991).
2. Although the Model Penal Code draft of 1980 incorporated a corroboration
requirement, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980), 35 states had already eliminated their corroboration requirements, and eight others
had limited the requirement. See Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement:Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1367-68 & nn.16-18 (1972).
3. Forty-nine states and the federal government have enacted rape-shield laws that
limit the admissibility of evidence about a victim's prior sexual history. See James A.
Vaught & Margaret Henning, Admissibility of a Rape Victim's PriorSexual Conduct in
Texas: A ContemporaryReview and Analysis, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 893, 895 & nn.9-10
(1992); see also Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Vcwtims in the State and Federal
Courts: A Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1986)
(examining how different states approach rape-shield legislation and proposing an
alternative legislative solution that preserves the underlying rationale of rape-shield laws
as well as the defendant's constitutional rights); Andrew Z. Soshnick, The Rape Shield
Paradox: Complainant Protection amidst Oscillating Trends of State Judicial
Interpretation,78 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 644, 644-45 & nn.1-3 (1987) (noting that
40 states enacted rape-shield laws through statute, nine states used evidentiary rules to
accomplish the protection, and Arizona provided protection through judicial opinion).
The federal rape-shield rule has been codified in FED. R. EVID. 412. For a brief history
and discussion of Rule 412, see 23 CHARLES A. WRIOHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACnIcE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5381-5393 (1980).
4. For an overviewof recent developments, see Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law:
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permission for husbands to beat their wives in the name of proper
discipline; 5 the view that children's complaints of sexual abuse are
primarily fantasy;6 and approval of sexual harassment as an implied
condition of work for women.7 But these apparent victories are
superficial. More persistent aspects of sexism have been merely pushed
underground.
In this article, I argue that the law is still sexist, but now in the name

of fact rather than doctrine. Courts have continued to use womanunfriendly habits of evaluating what counts as legal evidence.
Representatives of the law still want "just the facts, ma'am." But these
particular facts are hardly neutral or natural. Facts must be constructed

and interpreted just as laws must be,' and the production of facts as an
accomplishment of legal practitioners is only now beginning to be
examined.' When we begin to focus on the way in which facts are
Recent Developments in the Law of MaritalRape, 1989 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 343, 343
(1990) (stating that "most states recognize some legal limitation on a husband's 'right'
to have sex with his wife, but no consensus exists as to the extent of that limitation").
5. Such legal permission is customarily traced to William Blackstone. See 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 444 (Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1979) (1765-1769).
6. The view that complaints by children about sexual abusewere most likely fantasy
was forwarded most famously, and perhaps most powerfully, by Sigmund Freud. See
SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 126-35 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1977). This view has since been widely discredited for children's
complaints in general. See, e.g., JEFFREY HAUGAARD & N. DICKON REPUCCI, THE
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 149-50 (1988). It has also been discredited even about
Freud's owh cases. See JEFFREY M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD's
SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY 50 (1984); Suzanne Gearhart, The Scene of
Psychoanalysis, in IN DORA's CASE: FREUD-HYSTERIA-FEMINISM 106-07 (Charles
Bernheimer & Claire Kahane eds., 2d ed. 1990).
7. See Meritor Say. Bankv. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (concluding that sexual
harassment is actionable as a form of sexual discrimination).
8. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITYAND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 86-108 (1988) (providing an account of the way in which the
interpretation of law and the interpretation of fact go on simultaneously in the processes
of lawyering and judging).
9. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, 30
REPRESENTATIONS 42 (1990) (arguing that legal interpretation necessarily constructs
accounts of law and fact simultaneously and discussingwhether the flexibility judges have
in interpreting facts undermines the legitimacy of legal institutions) [hereinafter
Scheppele, FacingFacts]; Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2073 (1989) (discussing evidentiary habits in the construction of stories from
evidence) [hereinafter Scheppele, Telling Stories]. For other accounts of the practices of
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presented as natural and interpreted as truth, we see that much
misogynistic work is done in the construction of "reality."
This article focuses on one of many elements in the construction of

facts that works to the disadvantage of women. Women who delay in
telling their stories of abuse at the hands of men or who appear to change
their stories over time about such abuse are particularly likely to be
discredited as lars. The very fact of delay or change is used as evidence
that the delayed or changed stories cannot possibly be true."0 But abused
women frequently have exactly this response: they repress what
happened;"
they cannot speak;12 they hesitate, waver, and
3
procrastinate; they hope the abuse will go away; 4 they cover up for
fact-interpretation in law, see W. LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN,
REcoNSTRucTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 41-65 (1981); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 14-36, 80-102 (1949); BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND
NARRATIvE COHERENCE (1988); WILLIAM TWINIO, THEORIEs OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM
AND WIGMORE (1985); see also NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN
STORYTELLING AND THE LAw (David R. Papke ed., 1992) (collection on the uses of
narrative in legal reasoning). See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2073 (1989) (special issue on the uses of narrative in the law).
10. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of
a Fair Trialin Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-43 (1991); see
also People v. Brown, 524 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that "evidence
of the victim's prompt complaint should be admissible to overcome the adverse inference
which would otherwise arise from her silence"); Dawn M. DuBois, A Matter of Tine:
Evidence ofa Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROoK. L. REv. 1088 (1988)
(stating that the prompt-complaint doctrine is based on "antiquated perceptions of how
women respond to rape" and suggesting an alternative to the doctrine). But see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). The Model Penal
Code proposed placing strict time limits on those making rape complaints: "No
prosecution may be instituted or maintained under this Article unless the alleged offense
was brought to the notice of Public authorities within three (3) months of its occurrence."
Id.
11. Many rape victims suffer from short-term memory loss, which may result from
an attempt to escape from a fear-inducing situation. Lois G. Veronen et al., Treating
Fear and Anxiety in Rape Victims: Implicationsfor the Criminal Justice System, in
PERSPECIVES ON VICTIMOLOGY 150 (William H. Parsonage ed., 1979).
12. "During my last semester of law school, a friend tried to rape me in my
apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I lived alone. While it was happening, I felt
disembodied and I lost my voice." Terry N. Steinberg, Rape on College Campuses:
Reform Through Title IX, 18 J.C. & U.L. 39, 39 (1991) (describing the author's personal
experience as the victim of a violent rape).
13. Most women do not report sexualized threats and sexualized violence against
them at all. In one survey conducted in San Francisco, only 9.5% of the women reported
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their abusers; 15 they try harder to be "good girls"; 6 and they take the
blame for the abuse upon themselves.' 7 Such actions produce delayed or
altered stories over time,' which are then disbelieved for the very reason
that they have been revised.' 9
The disbelief of delayed or revised stories reflects a view that the truth
is singular, immediately apparent, and permanent-a view not unique to
law. As this article shows, the construction of facts in law is not based
only, or even primarily, on the special expertise of lawyers or on detailed
knowledge of the law. Of course, lawyers have a great deal of influence
in shaping the facts as they appear at trial. But lawyers, at least successful
their rapes. DL4iNA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL ExPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 31 (1984). Estimates on the number of rapes
which are actually reported range from 5 to 30%. MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN
FORCIBLE RAPE 27-28 (1971); see also Scheppele, supra note 1, at 1096 (stating that
approximately half of all victims fail to report rapes or rape attempts and that
acquaintance rapes are largely unreported). Of those who do report, many delay before
calling the police. One New York study found that most victims wait two to seven days
before reporting a rape, while a Massachusetts study reported that half of the rape
victims waited before reporting. Torrey, supra note 10, at 1016 n.10 (citing studies that
illustrate that only about half of rape victims report what has happened to them).
Apparently, women tend to wait even longer if they know their assailant. SEDELLE KATZ
& MARY A. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH
FINDNGs 188-90 (1979); see also Kimberly A. Mango, Students versus Professors:
Combatting Sexual HarassmentUnder Tile IX ofthe EducationAmendments of 1972, 23
CONN. L. REv. 355, 359 n.13 (1991) (citing a study of sexual-harassment victims at
Cornell University that found that less than one percent of the victims actually filed
complaints); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understandingthe Problem, Forgingthe Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 275 (1985)
(stating that experts agree that statistics underestimate the extent of woman-battering
because of the victim's reluctance to report the crimes).
14. In one government study, 52% of the female victims of sexual harassment
ignored the harassing conduct and did nothing about it. See U.S. MERT SYS.
PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE
24 (1988).
15. Battered women often refuse to tell anyone that they are being beaten. See
LENORE WALxER, THE BATERED WOMAN 74 (1979).
16. Experience of sexual harassment caused Anita Hill to keep notes on all the work
she did to show what a model employee she was. See infra text accompanying note- 3031.
17. See Kim Lane Scheppele & Pauline Bart, Through Women's Eyes: Defining
Dangerin the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39 J. Soc. ISSUES 63, 79 (1983).
18. See JuDrrH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 179-80 (1992).
19. See Torrey, supra note 10, at 1044.
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lawyers, do not just mobilize their legal expertise to achieve these ends.
They must also mobilize ordinary storytelling practices that are present
outside legal settings, in which credibility, coherence, and plausibility are
all judged against a background of common knowledge, itself shot through
with unthinking assumptions.
11. BELIEVING ANITA HILLF°

During a riveting weekend in October 1991, many Americans tuned
their television sets to the Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings of Judge
Clarence Thomas. These hearings had turned to the question of sexualharassment allegations made against Judge Thomas by his former close
aide, Professor Anita Hill. The .Republican members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, unfettered by technical rules of evidence that would
operate in a court of law, were able to show in stark form just how such
a witness could be discredited. They used every strategy they could think
of to undermine Professor Hill's testimony. Prominent among the
strategies was their focus on: (1) her delay in reporting the harassment;
and (2) the change in her accounts of what the harassment involved as she
went through successive retellings of the story. In the space opened up by
Professor Hill's silences and versions, Republican senators attempted to
insert various stock stories21 about the scorned woman, the woman who
20. At this point, this is hardly a controversial proposition. A survey'of state and

federal judges, taken around the time of the initial testimony, revealed that two-thirds of
them believed Anita Hill. See Hearings Turn off Judges; MIJ Survey Finds They Don't
Want Top Spot, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at 1. At the time of the hearings, a poll

showed that more Americans believed Clarence Thomas than believed Anita Hill. The
figures stood at 40% for Thomas and only 24% for Hill. See Jill Smolowe, Anita Hill's
Legacy: A Year After the Clarence Thomas Hearings, Women Wonder if the
Consciousness-RaisingMadeEnough of a Difference, TIME, Oct. 19, 1992, at 56. A year
later, however, several surveys revealed that more people believed Anita Hill than
believed Clarence Thomas. A Wall Street Journa/NBC News survey reported that 44%
of registered voters believed Hill while only 34% believed Thomas. Id. A U.S. News and
World Report poll reported a 38% to 38% deadlock in credibility ratings one year after
the hearings, while polls at the time registered 60% to 20% in favor of Thomas. Gloria
Borger et al., The Untold Story, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1992, at 28. It
is significant to note that the percentage of people who thought Hill had been treated
unfairly rose from 8% at the time of the hearings to 39% a year later. Id.
21. On stock stories, see ROcER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: A NEw LooK AT
REAL AND ARTIFCIALMEMoRY (1990); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1984).
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had lost touch with reality, and the woman motivated by political animus
who was making a bid for attention.
Although the Senate Judiciary Committee members who held the
hearings repeatedly emphasized that the proceedings were not a trial,
legalistic conceptions of "burden of proof" and "presumption of
innocence" were used throughout the three days of marathon sessions.?
But there the legal formality ended. Evidence was introduced without
supporting witnesses;' insinuations were made about Professor Hill's
motivation and credibility that had no basis in evidence;2 people without
any expertise in evaluating psychiatric claims were asked for their
opinions of Professor Hill's personality and sanity;' questioning was
limited by the unwillingness of then-Judge Clarence Thomas to answer
questions outside the scope that he deemed fit for inquiry,' even though
much of what he refused to talk about would have been thought relevant
had this been a proper trial; and witnesses who had relevant evidence to
introduce were kept dangling and ultimately not asked for the information
they had as part of the hearings.' Whatever the Senate hearings might
have been designed to accomplish, they left innuendo and unsubstantiated
stories in their wake.
These stories reveal some popular, common-sense biases in the
evaluation of historical accounts, particularly when women are making
claims that they have been the target of abuse. To see how popular
conceptions of truth can be mobilized to discredit a witness, it helps to
look first at the themes that politicians believe both will work to
undermine a claim and be understandable to the public. Then we can see
how these same strategies are used in more formal legal settings in muted
form. To begin, let us look at how those defending Judge Thomas
repeatedly emphasized that Professor Hill had delayed making her
accusations in the first place and had changed her story once she did.
22. See Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Associate Justice ofthe Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearingsofthe Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Federal News Service, Oct. 11, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File
[hereinafter Hearings].

23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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A. Silences
Professor Hill's initial delay in reporting the harassment-and her

public silence until the last moment before the confirmation vote was to
occur-was particularly salient to the senators. Senator Strom Thurmond
raised the issue in his opening statement, before Anita Hill had even
testified:
The alleged harassment she describes took place some ten years
ago. During that time, she continued to initiate contact with Judge
Thomas in an apparently friendly manner. In addition, Professor
Hill chose to publicize her allegations the day before the full
Senate would have voted to confirm Judge Thomas. While I fully
intend to maintain an open mind during today's testimony, I must
say that the timing of these statements raises a tremendous
number of questions which must be dealt with, and I can assure
all the witnesses that we shall be unstinting in our effort to
ascertain the truth.'
In other words, why didn't Professor Hill come forward at the time with
her accounts of sexual harassment? Given that she remained silent and
continued on as if nothing had happened, Senator Thurmond strongly
suspected that the initial silence and its revelation at the moment of the
confirmation hearings spoke for itself: the message was that the harassing
conduct never Occurred.
Judge Thomas himself emphasized Professor Hill's initial silence in
his account of events:
I find it particularly troubling that she never raised any hint that
she was uncomfortable with me. She did not raise or mention it
when considering moving with me to EEOC [Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission] from the Department of Education, and
she'd never raised it with me when she left EEOC and was
moving on in her life. And, to my fullest knowledge, she did not
speak to any other women working with or around me who would
feel comfortable enough to raise it with me, especially Diane Holt
[Thomas's secretary], to whom she seemed closest on my
28. Id.
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personal staff. Nor did she raise it with mutual friends such as
Linda Jackson or Gil Hardy.'
Senator Arlen Specter pressed Professor Hill on her initial silence,
focusing on her lack of contemporaneous notes about the harassing
behavior:
As an experienced attorney and as someone who was in the field
of handling sexual harassment cases, didn't it cross your mind
that if you needed to defend yourself from what you anticipated
he might do, that your evidentiary position would be much

stronger if you had made some notes?'
Professor Hill indicated that she kept detailed records of her assignments
and work products while the harassment was going on because she wanted
documentation of her professional performance in the event Judge Thomas
tried to fire her for refusing his solicitations. But only contemporaneous
records of the harassment itself would have demonstrated to Senator
Specter that it had actually happened.
Talk of the "eleventh hour charges" and of Professor Hill's puzzling
silence pervaded the hearings, as if the timing of her statement to the
committee alone was evidence of its falseness. A number of senators
believed that her only motivation for coming forward at that time was
political and that politics and truth-telling were mutually exclusive
motivations. So, the initial silence hung over the proceedings as evidence
that political revenge was the true story.

Trying to put her initial silence in some context, Professor Hill
explained how she reacted to Judge Thomas's conduct at the time:

My reaction to these conversations was to avoid them by
eliminating

opportunities

for us to engage

in extended

conversations. This was difficult because at the time I was his
only assistant at the Office of Education-or Office for Civil
Rights.... When Judge Thomas was made chair of the EEOC,

I needed to face the question of whether to go with him. I was
asked to do so, and I did. The work itself was interesting, and at
that time it appeared that the sexual overtures which had so
29. Id.
30. Id.
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troubled me had ended. I also faced the realistic fact that I had no
alternative job. While I might have gone back to private practice,
perhaps in my old firm or at another, I was dedicated to civil
rights work, and my first choice was to be in that field.
Moreover, the Department of Education itself was a dubious
venture. President Reagan was seeking to abolish the entire
department.'
Pressing Professor Hill on her failure to say anything at the time, Senator
Leahy asked what the mechanisms for reporting complaints within the
EEOC would have been then. Professor Hill responded by saying that she
believed she would have had to go to the Congressional oversight
committee. Asked what she believed would have happened had she done
so, Professor Hill replied: "Well, I can speculate that it might have been
difficult. I can speculate that had I come forward immediately after I left
the EEOC, I can speculate that I would have lost my job at Oral Roberts"
University, where she taught law.' Professor Hill did testify that she
talked to close friends about the harassment, but she did not speak to
anyone at work. When asked how she could have allowed this
"reprehensible conduct to go on right in the headquarters" of the agency
charged with enforcing sexual-harassment laws, 3 Professor Hill replied:
Well, it was a very trying and difficult decision for me not to say
anything further. I can only say that when I made the decision to
just withdraw from the situation and not press a claim or charge
against him, that I may have shirked a duty, a responsibility that
I had. And to that extent I confess that I am very sorry that I did
not do something or say something, but at the time that was my
best judgment. Maybe it was a poor judgment but it wasn't a
dishonest [one], and it wasn't a completely unreasonable choice
that I made given the circumstances.'
Some of the people to whom she originally confided the sexualharassment allegations testified on her behalf. Four friends and colleagues
of Professor Hill testified to versions of the harassment story that
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Professor Hill had told them either at the time that it occurred (witnesses
Ellen Wells, Susan Hoerchner, and John Carr) or when she was applying
for jobs and had to explain why she had left the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission where she worked with Clarence Thomas
(witness John Paul).Y Each of the four witnesses had contacted Professor
Hill after they heard of her allegations, offering to testify that she had told
them these stories earlier. None of the four witnesses had met any of the
other corroborating witnesses prior to appearing in Washington to testify
at the Senate hearings. But none of them were able to reproduce in detail
just what had occurred between Thomas and Hill, because Professor Hill's
accounts to each of them had been quite nonspecific, general, and brief.
Although the combined testimony of the four witnesses indicated that
Professor Hill had confided in each of them at or near the time when the
incidents were alleged to have occurred, the lack of detailed corroboration
led the Republican Senators on to their next problem with Professor Hill's
testimony.
B. Revisions
Many versions of events were presented during the course of the
hearings. Once her allegations'became known to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Professor Hill had three opportunities to narrate what had
happened: once, to the FBI agents who arrived at her house one evening
after work to interview her; again, to the Senate Committee staffers who
were trying to work out what she would say if called as a witness; and yet
again, to the whole world as it watched her testimony live on television
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. In the televised account, new
details emerged that had not been present in the earlier versions, though
none of the new details conflicted with earlier, more general stories. But
the very fact of the growing detail was used as evidence that Professor
Hill was lying. Senator Orrin Hatch described her stories as "[t]hree
different versions, each expansive, each successively expansive."'
Constancy of stories over time was presented as the crucial marker of
truth. Lack of constancy meant a lack of truth.
35. See Nomination of ClarenceThomas to AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court
of the United States:Hearingsofthe SenateJudiciary Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Federal News Service, Oct. 13, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
36. Hearings,supra note 22.
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Even Judge Thomas used Professor Hill's increasing detail as evidence
of the falsity of the charges:
The facts keep changing, Senator. When the FBI visited me, the
statements to this committee and the questions were one thing.
The FBI's subsequent questions were another thing, and the
statements today as I received summaries of them were another
thing. It is not my fault that the facts changed. What I'have said
to you is categorical; that any allegations that I engaged in any
conduct involving sexual activity, pornographic movies, attempted
to date her, any allegations, I deny. It is not true. So, the facts
can change, but my denial does not.37
Judge Thomas invoked the popular idea that statements that remain the
same over time appear more reliable than statements that appear to
change. He was asserting that his categorical denials were more true than
Professor Hill's "changing" facts precisely because his denials had never
been subject to revision.
That Professor Hill's story appeared to change over time received
much attention during Senator Specter's questioning. He tried to establish
crucial inconsistencies and additions, markers of falsehood of the whole
account, by taking each individual fact she had stated and holding it up
against prior individual facts she had described. Picking apart the stories
required denarrativizing the accounts or, in the words of Andrew Ross,
engaging in "the fetishizing of detail."38 One statement, surgically cut
from its context, was compared to another, similarly surgically cut.
Professor Hill, sensing that her story was getting lost in the false
concreteness of specificity, told Senator Specter:
Well, I think if you start to look at each individual problem with
the statement, then you're not going to be satisfied that it's true.
But I think the statement has to be taken as a whole. There is
nothing in this statement that-or nothing in my background,
nothing in my statement-there is no motivation that would show
that I would make up something like this. And I guess one really
37. Id.
38. Andrew Ross, The Private Parts of Justice, in RACE-INO JUSTICE, ENGENDERING PowER: ESSAYS

ON ANTrA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS,

CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 40, 56 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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does have to understand something about the nature of sexual
harassment. It is very difficult for people to come forward with
these things-these kinds of things. And it wasn't as though I
rushed forward with this information. I can only tell you what
happened and, to the best of my recollection, what occurred and
ask you to take that into account. Now, you have to make your
own judgment about it from there on, but I do want you to take
into account the whole thing.'
The whole story, Professor Hill argued, was more than the sum of its
parts.
Why didn't she tell the FBI about Coke can incident, Senator Specter
asked? Why did she omit a vivid description of the specific acts Judge
Thomas had told her he enjoyed when watching pornographic movies? The
FBI report contained "no reference to any mention of Judge Thomas's
private parts or sexual prowess or size, et cetera,"' noted Senator
Specter. Professor Hill responded to these questions by saying, "the FBI
agent made clear that if I were embarrassed about talking about
something, that I could decline to discuss things that were too
embarrassing but that I could provide as much information as I felt
comfortable with at that time." 4 Though she later said, "I never declined
to answer a question because it was too embarrassing," she also said, "I
told them the nature of the comments and did not tell them more
specifies." She added, "I was very uncomfortable talking to the agent
about that, these incidents. I am very uncomfortable now. But I feel that
it is necessary. The FBI agent told me that it was regular procedure to
come back and ask for more specifics if it was necessary. And so at that
time, I did not provide all the specifies that I could have." 42
C. Counterstories
On the other side, Judge Thomas denied Professor Hill's allegation
and substituted in part his own narrative of what had happened-that he
was the true victim in the proceedings. He could present himself in this
way because he called on the stock story of a man betrayed by a woman
39. Hearings, supra note 22.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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he had trusted. He had always treated his whole staff professionally,

cordially, and without the interjection of personal distractions, he said.
Most memorably, however, he imposed another strong narrative pattern
on the proceedings:
Senator, in the 1970s, I became very interested in the issue of
lynching, and if you want to track through this country in the
19th and 20th century the lynchings of black men, you will see
that there is invariably or in many instances a relationship with
sex and an accusation that that person cannot shake off. That is
the point that I'm trying to make, and that is the point that I was
making last night, that this is a high-tech lynching. I cannot shake
off these accusations because they play to the worst stereotypes
we have about black men in this country.'
And so Judge Thomas, who had tried in his first round of confirmation
hearings to epitomize "racelessness," as Toni Morrison has described
it," found himself invoking race as his ultimate defense.4' As Senator
Hatch led him through a series of questions concerning specific
stereotypes about black men and their sexual prowess that were invoked
by Professor Hill's charges, Judge Thomas confirmed in detail just which
allegations partook of stereotyping and which ones did not.
Supplementing the historical race narrative, Judge Thomas added
personal and political narratives. The personal narrative featured a man
from Pin Point, Georgia, who had grown up to be offered the greatest
opportunity in the world, only to have it snatched away from him by the
demeaning politics of race. But he would survive it:
This has been an enormously difficult experience, but I don't
think that that's the worst of it. I'm 43 years old, and if I'm not
confirmed, I'm still the youngest member of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I'll go on. I'll go back to my life
of talking to my neighbors, and cutting my grass, and getting a
43. Id.
44. Toni Morrison, Introduction:Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-]NO JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POwER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THoMAs, AND Tim
CONSTRUCTON OF SOCIAL REAUT at vii, xxi (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
45. See Hearings, supranote 22.

1992]

JUST T1E FAUT, MA"AM

Big Mac at McDonald's, and driving my car, [and] seeing my kid
play football. I'll live. I'll have my life back."
But, in Thomas's view, the country would not do as well:

I think the country has been hurt by this process. I think we are
destroying our country, we are destroying our institutions, and I
think it's a sad day when the U.S. Senate can be used by interest
groups and hate mongers and people who are interested in digging
up dirt to destroy other people, and who will stop at no tactics
when they can use our great institutions for their own political
ends. We are gone far beyond McCarthyism. This is far more
dangerous than McCarthyism. At least McCarthy was elected.' 7
Presenting himself as the man victimized by malicious uses of his race to
discredit him, Judge Thomas allied himself with the image of the United
States, which had been victimized as well.
D. Filling in Silences and Revising Revisions
Multiple versions from Hill's own accounting, a blanket denial and
counternarratives from Thomas, as well as many other versions from
various witnesses, left the Senate Judiciary Committee with a lot to pick
apart. And much of the strategy of those who won by getting Judge
Thomas through the confirmation process and onto the Supreme Court
depended on presenting Clarence Thomas as the real victim and Anita Hill
as the true aggressor. This reversal was accomplished in large measure by
presenting Anita Hill's story as a revised account, growing out of a
suspicious silence.
In the gap created within the initial account and in the spaces chipped
out of the apparent inconsistencies in Professor Hill's multiple versions,
many alternative narratives about Professor Hill were presented as
plausible. Witnesses supporting Judge Thomas presented alternative stories
that would explain Anita Hill's charges of sexual harassment, ranging
from Professor Hill's alleged grandiosity and ambition (witness J.C.
Alvarez), to Professor Hill's status as a "scorned woman" (witness Phyllis
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Berry), to her alleged flights of fantasy (witness John Doggett)." Other
witnesses for Judge Thomas expressed disbelief that he could do the acts
alleged (witnesses Nancy Fitch and Diane Holt), 49 opening up more
opportunities to recast Professor Hill's story as the story of a woman bent
on revenge, a woman given to fantasy, a calculating politica, 5° a
decontextualized woman lost in space.
The Hill/Thomas hearings were not a judicial forum. But the tactics
used in an attempt to discredit Hill's testimony borrow both from the
courtroom and from daily life. Stories that emerge from silence or that are
revised over time-elaborated, altered in tone, emerging in public out of
a silence that went before-are presented as suspect precisely because they
are delayed or revised. With the polls showing that the tactic worked to
make Judge Thomas's counter-stories more believable (or at least no less
credible) than Professor Hill's harassment narrative and with Senators
apparently believing the same, Clarence Thomas was confirmed.
III. SILENCES AND REVISIONS

Anita Hill is not the only woman to have remained silent about sexual
harassment. In fact, most women do not immediately talk about the details
of sexual harassment in ways that are likely to make prosecuting the
offenders straightforward in a court of law.51 Women who experience
rape, domestic abuse, incest, and other forms of sexualized threats and
sexualized violence often have the same reaction. 52 Many women do not
talk about the events with anyone at the time, and even those women
willing to talk at the time do not report the threats and violence against
them to the police or other officials who can mobilize the law.5 3 When
women first talk about the unspeakable to others, they often present initial
accounts that try to make things normal again. They try to smooth out
social relations by minimizing the harm of the abuse, engaging in self48. See id.
49. See id.
50. What else should we call a female politico?
51. See CATHARmNEA. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WoRING WOMEN

28 (1979).
52. See id.; see also Torrey, supra note 10, at 1044-45 (stating that "a significant
number of women who are raped do not report the rape for several days or may even
experience a 'silent reaction' and not tell anyone of the assault").
53. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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blame, telling stories that offer alternative explanations of events so that
the full consequences of the abuse do not have to be dealt with at the time,

and disguising the brutality through descriptive distortions of events.'
In psychological terms, women who have been sexually assaulted,

whether through rape, incest, domestic brutality, workplace harassment,

or extended periods of "domestic captivity," 55 often show signs of post-

traumatic stress disorder.' Survivors of extraordinary brutality often
literally cannot say what they have seen or put into words the terror that
they have felt.57 Picking through the shards of a former life, survivors
can no longer put the pieces into relation with each other to tell a coherent
and compelling narrative about how things disintegrated. As therapists
who have worked with traumatized patients have noted, "[t]he survivor's
initial account of the event may be repetitious, stereotyped, and
emotionless .... It does not develop or progress in time, and it does not
reveal the storyteller's feelings or interpretations of events.""8 As

women's sense of safety in the world has been shattered, so too has their
sense of narrative coherence."
54. See supra notes 11-12, 16-19 and accompanying text.
55. Herman, supra note 18, at 74.
56. See id. at 76-80.
57. Post-traumatic stress syndrome, as Herman's book makes clear, is not confined
to women. Combat veterans often have the same symptoms, as do Holocaust survivors,
political prisoners, and disaster victims, regardless of gender. See id. at 74-75, 181-82,
188. In the realm of criminal law, however, the vast majority of people suffering from
this psychological response are women whose brutalities generally come in the name of
common crimes. See id. at 175-87.
58. Id. at 175.
59. In our research on recovery from the trauma of rape, we discovered that women
who were attacked when they thought they were safe had more severe reactions than
women who were attacked when they believed that they were taking risks or were
otherwise in danger, controlling for the severity of violence in the assault. See Scheppele
& Bart, supra note 17, at 76-78. For the women with the most disoriented reactions,
narrative consistency was disturbed, but so was any sense of associative logic. See id.
One woman who had been attacked in a cornfield near her childhood home (where she
felt safe) developed a terror of urban elevators. Id. at 69. A woman attacked at 10 A.M.
coming back from the grocery store felt terrified to drive. See id. at 77. In one of the
most severe reactions, a woman who was attacked at a party given by friends was
subsequently placed in a mental institution for several years. Id. at 70-71. All of these
women had trouble explaining why their fear spread the way it did from situations like
the one in which they were attacked to other situations, apparently unrelated to the
outside observer, in which the woman had previously felt safe as well. Nothing "made
sense" in conscious terms.
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Later, however, often through working in therapy, becoming overtly
feminist, or getting enough emotional distance on the events to begin to
deal with them, brutalized women revise their stories. Women who were
silent begin to speak out for the first time. Women who were silent about
the violence, who at the time said that nothing happened, or who took the
blame themselves for anything that did happen, begin to tell stories of
abuse. As these stories are told with more confidence, they "may change
as missing pieces are recovered. This is particularly true in situations
where [the survivor] has experienced significant gaps in memory. " '
What the survivor is trying to do at this point is to figure out a story that
makes sense of her memories. The process of making coherence out of
previously fragmented knowledge results in adjustments in the details that
are recalled or in the way the details are put together. 61 One sign of
recovery from the abuse is that women's stories change over time.'
Though the influence of extreme trauma on narrative consistency over
time is quite pronounced, lesser traumas may produce something of the
same effect. Women who have experienced sexual harassment at work
also report many of the same symptoms as women who have suffered
more extreme forms of physical abuse.I Women who have been "merely
hassled" also show signs of extreme stress.' Even Anita Hill, who
60.
61.
62.
63.
effects,

HERMAN, supra note 18, at 179-80.
See id. at 176-81.
See id.
The woman who has been sexually harassed may experience "severe physical
including irritability, nausea, headaches, loss of concentration, dizzy spells,

stomach aches, fatigue, muscle spasms, hypertension and psychogenic pain." See Tina
Kirstein-Ezzell, Eradicating tle WI Sexual Harassmentby Recognizing an Employer's
Duty to Prohibit Sexual Harassment, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 383, 386 (1991) (footnote
omitted); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1519

(M.D. Fla. 1991) (explaining that women who had been sexually harassed at work
reported sleep disturbances and other signs of trauma).
64. My suspicion is that many women who experience sexual harassmentas students
drop out of school or otherwise significantly change their career plans to avoid the men
who harass them. Because most studies of sexual harassment in schools involve women
who have remained at the school, those who left are not included. Based on discussions
with many undergraduateand graduate students, I can say that being "hassled" by a male
teacher or by male students has led quite a few female students to lose sleep, to go into
therapy, to start doing badly in their coursework, and, eventually, to leave the university.
One woman student I spoke with had been the victim of a particularly cruel joke at a
fraternity party. This woman was unable to attend classes without snickering men from
that fraternity teasing her and reminding her of the event. She had difficulty eating and
sleeping, and eventually withdrew from school. The men who did this to her have
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stayed on the job and tried to ignore the harassment she later publicly
described, "was hospitalized on an emergency basis for five days for acute
stomach pain which [she] attributed to stress on the job."' Eventually,
the accounts of what produced the stress may change as the details emerge
from a traumatized memory and as the world feels a safer place in which
to tell complete stories.' Or, as Anita Hill explained, she was asked a
direct question
ten years later and could not lie about what had
happened. 67
But we should not see this problem of shifting stories as being only
a psychological response to individualized events. Larger forces are in
play that provide a social and cultural context in which shifting stories
appear as a response to sexualized threats and sexualized violence-and in
which the threats and the violence are themselves displaced and denied
through the fact of delayed accounts. Psychological explanations may be
able to tell us how the individually experienced events are cognitively
managed, but we need to understand more about the historical and cultural
setting to understand why those cognitive strategies are necessary in the
first place.
My suspicion is that stories that shift in their focus, detail, or
attribution of blame over time are a response to violence when violence
is normatively unexpected. Such violence may be very common, but it
may be culturally disguised as the rare deviation from generally accepted
norms. Despite estimates that as many as fifty percent of all women will
be victims of domestic violence at some point in their lives,' and that
nearly one in three women will be raped,' woman-battering and rape are
graduated, but the woman has never returned to school. Another student, sexually
harassed by a male faculty member, quit school in mid-semester. Years later, she
returned to try to complete the courses she abruptly left, wiser about the effects of sexual
harassment, but with a large gap in her resume that needs to be explained when she
applies for a job.
65. Hearings, supra note 22.
66. See HERMAN, supra note 18, at 183.

67. See Hearings,supra note 22.
68. See Martha R. Mahoney,LegalImages ofBatteredWomen: Redefiningthe Issue
ofSeparation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1991) (citing LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERm
WOMAN 19 (1979)).
69. This figure is contested. CompareAllan G. Johnson, On the PrevalenceofRape
in the United States, 6 SIGNs 136, 144-45 (1980) (using FBI statistics and very
conservative assumptions to estimate that 20-30% of women between the ages of 12 and
70 will experience a rape attack in their lifetimes) and Diana E.H. Russell & Nancy
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still portrayed as unusual occurrences that need special explanation in the
individual case. The "normal" case is constructed as the nonviolent
marriage or the unraped woman, and the battered or raped woman stands
out against this picture of normality as an exception. Because exceptions
are generally explained by models that emphasize deviance, the women
subjected to "deviant" practices come under the spotlight as participants,
perhaps even willing participants, in deviant conduct. The woman is
examined to see if she is to blame. For women, if violence is "not
supposed to happen" or is "not supposed to happen to me," then it may
be hard to narrate the violence credibly because she must first explain to

herself why this particular "I"was singled out for the violence that was
not supposed to happen and why this particular "him" did this. To
construct such a story, a woman must narrate into some powerful cultural
headwinds, forces of opposition that appear natural, unless she can cast
her experience in the light of an obvious, socially comprehensible
narrative. 70
The culturally available narratives about sexualized violence are

stories of provocation, 7' passion, 72 or deranged character or insanity, 7'

Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited, 8 SIGNS 688, 694-95
(1983) (using somewhat less conservative assumptions to estimate that 46% of women
will be victims of a rape attack during their lifetimes) with Douglas Laycock, Vicious
Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 CoNsT. COMMNTARY 395, 403-04 (1991) (using data
from a 1985 Department of Justice National Crime Survey to estimate that 15% of
women between the ages of 12 and 80 will experience a rape, attempted rape, or verbal
threat of rape in their lifetimes).
70. We might interpret Susan Estrich's account of a "real rape" as a sexual assault
that fits nicely within a culturally available story. After Estrich, who is white, was raped
by a stranger, who was black and who also stole her car, police considered her a credible
victim and treated her with sympathy. When women are raped by men of the same social
category as their own and in a "friendly" setting, however, their stories do not fit the
typical rape model and, therefore, are not readily believed. See ESTRICH, supra note 1,
at3.
71. Many people believe that most rapes would not happen if women did not
provoke them. Nineteen percent of Anglo men, 25% of Anglo women, 73% of Black
men, 23% of Black women, 32% of Mexican-American men and 70% of MexicanAmerican women believe this to be true. JOYCE E. WILUAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES,
THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATrrTUDES 135 thl.17 (1981).
72. James Cheek and Neil Malamuth report that up to 40% of both men and women
indicate that it is acceptable for a man to force a woman to have sex with him if she
"gets the man sexually excited, is stoned or drunk, or has had intercourse with other
men." James V.P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, An Empirical Assessinent of Some
Feminist Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 414, 416 (1985).
73. When asked whether rapists were mentally ill, Williams and Holmes report that
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told against the backdrop of the assumed rationality of all conduct. People
do things for reasons, we learn to believe. In criminal law, as in detective
stories, we solve the crime by finding the motive, 74 and to find the
motive, we find the reason. If a man is violent, then he must have had a
reason. Perhaps he was provoked and it is really the woman's fault. Or
perhaps it was a sign of passion and then perhaps the woman brought it
on. Or perhaps it is a "character issue" and the accused is a sexual
deviant, a pervert, or a criminal type. Or perhaps he did not have a
reason, in which case, he is crazy.
Faced with the evident social competencies of many men who harass,
beat, rape, or assault women,75 the narrative routes that emphasize
insanity or serious character defects often seem blocked. Only "real

rapes," those committed by strangers, often with weapons, against random

women, 76 are arguably good candidates for the insanity narrative. That

leaves passion or provocation as available, believable narrative strategies
for the routine daily violence that women often experience. But passion

narratives contradict the methodical, systematic form that abuse often takes
over time. Women who are subjected to repeated, deliberate, personally

targeted harassment by men have a hard time seeing passion as the cause
when the conduct seems quite calculated. Provocation narratives put the

blame back on the woman, silencing her when she tries to make sense of
what it was she did that could have produced this attack.
Suppose the woman believes the provocation story-that she is to

blame after all. Women often tell stories of self-blame and complicity, if
they say anything at all, at the time that sexualized violence occurs. 7
91% of Anglo men, 92% of Anglo women, 83% of Black men, 98% of Black women,
87% of Mexican-American men, and 63% of Mexican-American women believed that
this was the case. See WILLIAMS & HOLMEs, supra note 71, at 136 tbl.18.
74. Technically, evidence of motive is not required for criminal prosecutions.
WAYNE R. LAFAvE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CAsEs, COMMENTS AND QUESTIoNs 105
(2d ed. 1988). But it is hard to convince a jury that the defendant actually did the crime
he is accused of unless there is a motive.
75. See Check & Malamuth, supra note 72, at 415 (noting that "[despite ...
numerous efforts to identify ways in which rapists are abnormal, the results have
generally indicated very few differences between rapists and nonrapists which would
justify any conclusion that rapists are grossly abnormal"). In a study of "normal" male
college students, about 35% reported some proclivity to rape women and 20% reported
a strong proclivity. See Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity among Males, 37 J. Soc.

Issuns 138, 140 (1981).
76. The term is taken from Susan Estrich. See EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 3.
77. In a study of rape victims, we discovered that many women engaged in self-
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Such self-blame often comes through in a feeling of shame, a feeling that
would only make sense if the victim were taking the blame for the actions
of the perpetrator. 8 But shame may be produced by the recognition both
that her own story of abuse requires, as a matter of cultural legibility, a
prominent role for herself as the reason for the abuser's conduct and also
a knowing judgment of what such a role would mean about herself in the
eyes of others. If the victim eventually recasts her story, the story initially
told from a perspective of self-blame may eventually be replaced by a
story with another narrative organization-one that allows a subaltern
cultural frame to be the organizing feature of such a narrative. Perhaps,
just perhaps, the sexualized violence a woman has experienced is actually
common enough to be believed without the requirement that she act the
provocateur. Perhaps this violence is the statistical norm and not the freak
exception. And perhaps the sexualized violence women experience is the
result of women's disadvantaged and sexualized position in the larger
society. Perhaps it is not her personal and individual fault.
These later revised stories, replacing either silence or an alternative
version of events, lose their social authority as a statement of truth
precisely because they are generally late in arriving. They also lose their
legal power for the same reason. Revised stories present problems in the
law because one of the implicit rules juries and judges use for finding
stories to be true is the same rule that the Senate Judiciary Committee
invoked in the Hill/Thomas hearings:79 to be believable, stories must be
told immediately and must stay the same over time.' Truth is supposed
to be fixed and stable. Real truth doesn't shift with time. Victims of abuse
blame as a way of recovering from brutal rape attacks. By telling herself that she can

avoid rape in the future if only she does not walk home at night alone, if only she does
not go into the park by herself, or if only she does not get into elevators with strange
men, a woman can make the world seem manageable again. This enables her to recover
from the assault more quickly than other women who do not tell themselves these selfblaming accounts. See Scheppele & Bart, supra note 17, at 79.
78. Feelings of shame have been common among survivors of Nazi concentration
camps. See PRiMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 70 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Summit Books 1988). The shamecomes from one's memory of imagined complicity with
the oppressor and of interpreting the horrors one has suffered as a judgment of one's
self. "Coming out of the darkness," Levi writes, "one suffered because of the reacquired
consciousness of having been diminished." Id. at 75.
79. See Hearings, supra note 22.
80. See id.

19921

JUST THE FACTS, MAAM

may tell one story at the time of the trauma and another story later. But
these later stories are rarely believed.

IV. ERASING SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE IN COURT
If these presumptions in favor of immediate and coherent narratives
are embedded in the culture of facticity outside of formal law, then we
would expect to see delayed and revised stories being attacked as false
when women press claims of sexualized violence in court. And this is
exactly what happens.
A. Unreliable Women
In Reed v. Shepard,81 for example, JoAnn Reed worked as a
"civilian jailer" in the Vandenburgh County, Indiana Sheriff's
Department, beginning in mid-1979,' The civilian jailer program
employed people to take care of prisoners-guarding, feeding,
transporting, and processing them-as less costly substitutes for the more
expensive deputy sheriffs.' In 1984, Reed was fired, without a hearing,
for alleged misconduct in her job." Reed charged, under section 1983
of the United States Code," that she had been denied due process. The
district court" and the court of appeals' found that, as an at-will
employee, she was not entitled to have a hearing before her employment
was terminated but that the allegations of misconduct were serious enough
to justify her termination in any event."5 She had sued on multiple
counts, however, also charging that her employer had engaged in sexual
discrimination and that she had been sexually harassed on the job in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." The story she told about
81. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 485.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
86. Reed v. Shepard, No. EV85-21-C (S.D. Ind. May 25, 1990) (unpublished
opinion of Chief Judge Gene E. Brooks).
87. Reed, 939 F.2d at 484.
88. See id. at 489. The district court's conclusion on this issue is mentioned in the
opinion of the court of appeals. See id. at 488.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see Reed, 939 F.2d at 488.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

sexual harassment was clearly a revised story. The court of appeals quoted

the trial judge:
"Plaintiff contends that she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and
sally port doors, that she was subjected to suggestive remarks
... , that conversations often centered around oral sex, that she

was physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head was
grabbed and forcefully placed in members' laps, and that she was
the subject of lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that she had
chairs pulled out from under her, a cattle prod with an electrical

shock was placed between her legs, and that they frequently
tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket, handcuffed inside

an elevator, handcuffed to the toilet and her face pushed into the
water, and maced. Perhaps others."'
"The record confirms these and a number of other bizarre activities
in the jail office," the appeals court added.91 "By any objective standard,

the behavior of the male deputies and jailers toward Reed revealed at trial
was, to say the least, repulsive."Im

Why, then, did the court go on to conclude that however offensive the
conduct of her male coworkers was, it was not sexual harassment?

Because, the court found, the conduct was apparently not repulsive to
Reed at the time:'
90. Reed, 939 F.2d at 486 (footnote omitted) (quoting Reed, No. EV85-21-C).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. I should explain something important about this case to put the
discussion of this opinion in context. Reed had been charged with trafficking marijuana
to some of the inmates in the prison and with encouraging two female inmates to assault
another inmate with whom they shared a cell. Apparently, substantial evidence existed
to sustain these charges, including a confession, though the evidence does not appear in
the appeals court report and the confession was later retracted. See id. at 487. The judges
apparently believed that Reed was not a terribly sympathetic character in general, and
this undoubtedly affected their treatment of her sexual-harassment claims. But the
principles of law on which the three-judge panel unanimously relied and the evidence
they used to illustrate such principles have implications for the consideration of sexualharassment claims more generally. I focus on the court's treatment of the sexualharassmentclaim in isolation because the reasoning presumably would also apply to more
sympathetic victims.
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Reed not only experienced this depravity with amazing resilience,
but she also relished reciprocating in kind. At one point during
her job tenure Reed was actually put on probation for her use of
offensive language at the jail. At the same time, she was
instructed to suspend the exhibitionistic habit she had of not
wearing a bra on days she wore only a T-shirt to work. She also
participated in suggestive giftgiving by presenting a softball
warmer to a male co-worker designed to resemble a scrotum and
by giving another a G-string. Reed enjoyed exhibiting to the male
officers the abdominal scars she received from her hysterectomy
which necessarily involved showing her private area. Many
witnesses testified that Reed revelled in the sexual horseplay,
instigated a lot of it, and had "one of the foulest mouths" in the
department. In other words, the trial revealed that there was
plenty of degrading humor and behavior to go around.'
The court emphasized that this reprehensible conduct did not happen
to other women working in the jail, but only to Reed.' Three women
working there testified that other women had not been further harassed
after they asked the men to stop doing these sorts of things to them.'
But apparently, Reed never told the men to stop. Why? Reed testified at
trial:
Because it was real important to me to be accepted. It was
important for me to be a police officer and if that was the only
way that I could be accepted, I would just put up with it and kept
[sic] my mouth shut. I had supervisors that would participate in
this and you had a chain of command to go through in order to
file a complaint. One thing you don't do as a police officer, you
don't snitch out [sic] another police officer. You could get
9
hurt. 7

94. Id. at 486-87.
95. See id. at 487.
96. See id. The fact that other women had experienced this conduct and had to tell
the men to stop was not used by the court as evidence of a hostile working environment.
The men, after all, did stop when asked, erasing their prior conduct as far as the court
was concerned. See id.
97. Id. at 492 ([sic]s in original).
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court was a revised account, apparently inconsistent with what she and
others said about her reactions at the time. And the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals did not believe her.
Quoting from the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Wumson,9 the Seventh Circuit panel indicated that harassment must be
so severe or pervasive as "'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment,'"' if a claim is
to succeed. But to show that this conduct was "in fact" harassing, the
victim of such treatment had to indicate at the time that she did not
welcome the behavior in question." ° In this case, Reed's claim could
not succeed because she had not indicated while these events were
occurring that this treatment was unwelcome. In other words,
contemporaneous evidence is required to establish any claim of sexual
harassment, and this requirement is hard-wired into the doctrine. 10'
Judge Manion quoted the trial judge approvingly when he said that the
plaintiff had been treated this way "'because of her personality rather than
her sex'" (as if the defendants were capable of separating these things) and
that the "'defendants cannot be held liable for conditions created by
[Reed's] own action and conduct.'"" Her failure to object at the time
to this behavior and her attempt to deal with it by trying to act like "one
of the boys" not only defeated her ability to make a claim, but also
justified the conclusion that she had brought this treatment on herself and
was therefore the person who was primarily responsible.
But the record sustains another story, one not narrated by her
coworkers who were witnesses at the trial. The record documents that
Reed was physically beaten, that she was punched in the kidneys, that she
had an electric cattle prod shoved between her legs, that she was forcibly
restrained by being handcuffed on numerous occasions, that her head was
shoved into a toilet, that she was repeatedly tickled, and that she was
maced.ye That was in addition to the extensive and personalized verbal
abuse to which she was subjected. Moreover, these individual facts were
98. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
99. Reed, 939 F.2d at 491 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
100. See id. at 491-92.
101. See id. at 492-93
102. Id. at 492 (quoting Reed v. Shepard, No. EV85-21-C (S.D. Ind. May 25,
1990)).
103. Id. at 486.
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all found to be true by the court. 1°4 The court could have concluded that
this evidence supported another story, one that did not erase the violence
against Reed by constructing her as a consenting woman, but rather one

that presented her as a victim of physical abuse. 1o Although Reed did
not explicitly object at the time, the violence to which her coworkers
subjected her could be considered felonies anywhere other than in a

"friendly" setting.
The court failed to see her claim, I believe, because her sexual-

harassment complaint was delayed. Her complaint did not emerge for the
first time until after she had been fired. The judges obviously believed a

revenge narrative, one in which a bitter employee recast "horseplay" as
"abuse" to get back at her coworkers.

But another narrative possibility exists here. Women who have
experienced sexual harassment say, as Anita Hill said, that they want to

keep their jobs." 6 They want the abuse to stop, but they also do not

want to make waves.1°7 They want to fit into the workplace environment
as if they really belonged there. And to fit in, they endure the abuse.1°8

It is as if women are making deals that they will tolerate the abuse if the
employer just tolerates their presence.
104. See id. at 491.
105. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. In Meritor, the Supreme Court found that the
appearance of voluntary participation by the victim did not defeat a successful harassment
claim. The behavior that Mechelle Vinson complained of in Meritor was so obviously
harassment in the view of the unanimous Supreme Court that her failure to object directly
to her boss, who had forced her into a sexual relationship with him, did not bar her
subsequent claim. See id. Why should the Seventh Circuit not consider what happened
to JoAnn Reed as harassment also under this standard?
106. As Martha R. Mahoney noted, women generally need their jobs and face a
hard time finding others in an economy that does not in general pay women very'well.
See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea ofLeaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1291-99 (1992).
107. Women fear that they will be retaliated against if they complain, regardless of
whether they win a lawsuit. They fear that their careers and their reputations will suffer
if they do not put up with the abuse. Tamar Lewin, A Case Study of Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1991, at A18.
108. In one survey, only nine percent of the women quit their jobs immediately after
the harassment began, although more women quit once the harassment escalated. See LIN
FARLEY, SExUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 2122 (1978). Another report found that fewer than five percent of sexually harassed men
and women ever report the harassment or take other action. See Sandra S. Tangri et al.,
Sexual Harassmentat Work: Three ExplanatoryModels, 38J. Soc. ISSUES 33, 47 (1982)
(noting that most, but not all, sexual-harassment victims failed to report the behavior).
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But once a woman has been fired, that deal is off. No longer able to
justify to herself that she is at least getting something out of having put up
with the abuse, she files suit claiming sexual harassment. If women's
greatest fears in complaining about sexual harassment are that they will be
fired, then the greatest barrier against bringing a complaint is eliminated
when they lose their jobs. Rather than seeing a suit following dismissal as
evidence of revenge, judges might see such a suit as the evidence about
what the implicit terms of continued employment were. The
understandings women have about the conditions under which they work
are disturbed by their dismissals. If courts looked at the conduct, like the
persistent and abusive conduct to which JoAnn Reed was subjected, and
they see only consent, they should ask themselves just why a woman
would consent to be treated like that. Perhaps then they would see that the
apparent consent reflects a lack of bargaining power and a lack of options
rather than the active approval that signifies free choice.
By locking her into a revenge narrative on the sexual-harassment
claim, Reed's coworkers and the judges in the Seventh Circuit were
effectively penalizing her twice: once for appearing to consent to the
abusive treatment in the first place, and again for changing her mind about
what it all meant. Reed, in this revenge narrative, then became the
problem as the court shifted attention away from the conduct of her male
coworkers to Reed's own actions and accounts. It was her conduct in the
first place that allowed the harassment to occur, and it was her desire for
revenge after the fact that brought the case into court. Her male coworkers
were presented as accessories to a story in which the active agent was
Reed. It was Reed's motives, actions, and stories that the court took to be
the problem. She may have come into court claiming victimization, but
she left the process having become the aggressor.
How did this inversion occur? The story JoAnn Reed told in court was
inconsistent with her coworkers' interpretations of her actions at the time.
Her coworkers' readings of her actions on the job were presented as if
those interpretations were her contemporaneous accounts of the events in
question.' ° Reed's own story, when she finally got to tell it in court,
109. See Reed, 939 F.2d at 490. The court also found that she had not been

subjected to sexual discrimination in employment and that all the ways in which she was

treated differently from her coworkers were due to her rank as a civilian jailer rather
than her sex. See id. at 490-91. No evidence was given on the relative numbers of men
and women who held the ranks of the less prestigious civilian jailer and the more
lucrative and privileged position of deputy sheriff in this case, though there were clearly
some men and women in each rank. See id. Everyone knew, however, how Reed was
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was therefore presented as revised, changing over time from a story in
which she appeared to enjoy the abuse, to a story in which she abhorred
it.
When stories are revised, judges and juries use that very fact as
evidence that the later story is false, even when the victim did not grasp
the chance to tell the first story herself. In addition, victims whose
accounts are revised can be blamed for bringing everything on themselves
because their narrative instability makes the later story unbelievable. Such
narrative instability casts doubts on the motives of the woman who comes
late to her story of blame, and she becomes the aggressive initiator of
trouble for others.
While this pattern is the general rule, certain special cases exist in
which revised stories can be presented as credible. Such exceptions
include cases in which: (1) multiple women establish a pattern of conduct
on the part of a particular man; (2) corroborating physical evidence exists
to back up the woman's later account; and (3) an expert reconstructs the
woman's initial story as a delusion for psychological reasons. It is to these
exceptions, the exceptions that demonstrate the solidity of the implicit rule
against revised stories, that we now turn.
B. Safety in Numbers
If women are to be believed when they revise their stories, they have
a better chance if they find other women to do the same. Reconstructing
as nonconsensual a sexualized relationship that appeared consensual at the
time is very hard to do credibly. Women typically find that they have to
establish that their experience was part of a pattern that other women
experienced as well. Just as Anita Hill would have been more credible if
a parade of former employees of Clarence Thomas had come forward with
similar complaints, other women claiming abuse, harassment, even rape,
find that there is greater narrative safety in numbers. One example can be
found in Daly v. Derrick."0
and women who held the ranks of the less prestigious civilian jailer and the more
lucrative and privileged position of deputy sheriff in this case, though there were clearly
some men and women in each rank. See id. Everyone knew, however, how Reed was
treated, and women who testified indicated that they had to explicitly opt out of such
treatment themselves. See id. at 487. What sort of workplace is this in which a person
is held to consent to such violent, dangerous, and abusive treatment?
110. 281 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Ct. App. 1991).
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In September 1977, Maura Daly was fifteen-years old:
Before the start of classes [at a high school in California], [Maura
Daly] attended a retreat designed to encourage Alternative School
students and teachers to get to know each other. [Tommy]
Derrick, who taught psychology, human sexuality, and social
studies, also attended the retreat.
One evening, Derrick and several students were giving each
other massages. As Derrick massaged Maura, he began to touch
her in a sexual manner. His sexual overtures to her continued
during the retreat, and she eventually acceded to his request that
she orally copulate him. He impressed on her the need to keep
their relationship secret.
Following the retreat, Derrick had sexual contact with Maura
after school once every few weeks, either at his home or inside
his van. Although she was happy to be receiving special attention
from a teacher whom she liked and admired, she felt
uncomfortable with their sexual activities and consequently
experienced confusion. In the spring of her sophomore year, she
told Derrick she did not wish to see him any more. After that he
sought no further sexual contact with her."'
During the time that their sexual relationship continued, Maura
described Tommy as her boyfriend:
The relationship was her first experience of romance and love
...
. He repeatedly told her that she could make her own
decision whether to be sexually involved with him, thereby
inducing her to believe that she was equally responsible for their
relationship. In fact, however, Maura was overwhelmed by his
attentions due to her desire for a replacement for the father she
had earlier lost through divorce. She did not perceive his conduct
as wrong in any legally actionable sense; the only injuries of
which she was aware were pain at the distance from her that
Derrick maintained at school, jealousy at Derrick's sexual
attentions to other students, and from time to time a sense that,
111. Id. at 711-12.
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rather than being a2true friend, he was using her to satisfy his
own sexual needs."1

In November 1986, Daly sought therapy because she was having
"sexual difficulties" with her current boyfriend.'
In the course of
therapy, she mentioned that she had been "molested" by a high-school
teacher."' "Sometime around March 1987, she began to realize how
painful and damaging her relationship with Derrick had been for her."'1 5
She filed a tort suit against him for damages for the harm he had caused
her.
This case is one of a growing number now being brought as a result
of the "delayed discovery" of childhood molestation."16 While most of
the cases are not brought against teachers, but are instead brought against
male relatives, the gist of the complaint is the same: A minor, usually but
not always female, is pressured for sexual favors by a man who has some
power over her. She endures the molestation in silence, because the man
tells her to be quiet. She may even feel so compromised that she actively
engages in preserving the secrecy because the revelation of the activity
implicates her as well. Because she does not talk with anyone else about
it, she can be influenced strongly by the man's narrative about what is
happening. Although she may feel the sexual advances are inappropriate,
she does not know how to articulate this as a conscious matter. Sometimes
the girl actively claims to enjoy the sexual encounters at the time, valuing
the attention they bring. Years later, almost always through therapy, the
now-grown woman "learns" for the first time how to name what happened
7
and what these events have done to her.1
112. Id. at 718.
113. Id. at 712.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. For an explanation of this issue, see Jocelyn B. Lamm, EasingAccess to the
Courts for Incest Viwtims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery
Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189 (1991).
117. California has had a particularly dramatic history with these cases. In DeRose
v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987), the court rejected the claim of a
woman who alleged that her grandfather had molested her repeatedly when she was
between the ages of 4 and 11, finding that the statute of limitations had tolled on the
case. See id. at 377. Because she knew everything she needed to know to file the claim
within the statute of limitations, the court reasoned, she should not be allowed to proceed
with the case after that time. In 1990, the California legislature enacted a statute designed
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In Daly, the court was called upon to decide whether the lower court
had been correct in throwing out the case on grounds that the statute of
limitations had tolled. "' Ruling that there was a triable issue in the
possibility of a delayed discovery of a material fact, the court let the case
proceed.'19 But given the judges' emphasis that a new California statute
made them do it out of consistency, it is doubtful that the court would
have allowed this complaint to proceed without the push from the
2
legislature. 0
The Daly case presents a stark case of a revised story. Daly clearly
thought at the time that her relationship with Derrick was romantic,

consensual, and wonderful-usually. Only later did she come to believe
that this relationship was abusive and that he had taken advantage of her
innocence and immaturity. Daly starkly presents a case of a complete

refraining, in which consent at the time is later cast as consent that was
not "real." Though the court allowed her case to proceed, Daly would
probably have had a hard time establishing her initial nonconsent. But she
had help.
As it turned out, two other women had experienced the same

treatment from Derrick while he was their high-school teacher. In fact, all
three of these women were friends in high school and had not realized that
Derrick had a sexual relationship with each of them at the same time.
to supercedeDeRoseby extending the statute of limitations on childhood molestations to
eight years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or three years after all
of the relevant facts could have been discovered, whichever is later. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1993).
118. See Daly, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 716, 720.
119. See id. at 718.
120. In fact, in Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Ct. App. 1991), the
court dismissed an action brought by a woman against her grandfather 15 years after the
last molestation occurred. The molestations had continued for nine years, during which
time her grandfather had allegedly sexually abused, threatened, and used physical
violence against her. Nonetheless, the court held that 15 years after the last event was
too late to bring the suit because the plaintiff had always known that her grandfather had
sexually molested her and that his acts were committed against her will and without her
consent. See id. at 477. The fact that the woman claimed she suffered from "dissociation
and psychological accommodation" only created uncertainty as to the amount of damages
and did not keep her from knowing enough to file the case within the statutorily defined
limits. Id. She said that she was not fully aware of the events, however, until she
received therapy. See id. at 474. The dissent emphasized that Marsha V. could have
possibly won in court under the new statute, because she filed within three years of
discovering the injury. See id. at 478-85 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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Only after Maura Daly had gone into therapy and came to see Derrick's
treatment of her as abusive did Daly's mother then call around and find
that two other high-school classmates of Maura's had similar stories to
tell. They later joined the lawsuit.
Does this, change the credibility of the revised narratives of each of
the women? For most people, it probably does. But why should three
women revising their stories in the same way be more believable than one
woman doing this alone? In the case of a lone woman accusing her former
lover of abuse, it is easier to tell a stock counter-story about a particular
relationship gone sour. But when three such relationships exist that were
all being maintained at the same time in an apparently monogamous
culture, then each woman appears entitled to adjust her story to take into
account that Derrick was misrepresenting to each of them just what the
specific relationship was at the time. Derrick's violation of another norm,
the norm of monogamy, makes the violation of other norms about abuse
seem more plausible. He can be constructed as a deviant all around, not
the innocent man whose former lover now takes advantage of a convenient
feminism to turn him into a monster after the fact. With three women
providing evidence of collective misrepresentation, Derrick looks less like
a poor guy with bad judgment in relationships and more like a predator.
Several women, each changing their stories in the same way
independently, seem more believable than one woman who does this
alone. The sheer volume of the revised stories changes the credibility of
each one. Derrick's conduct becomes part of apattern that each individual
woman could not have seen alone. This new story is a different story, told
for the first time when the narratives of the three women intersect. Taking
the three relationships together, against backdrop assumptions about
monogamous sexual affiliations, Derrick looks less "normal" and the basis
of a deviance narrative is laid. There is a way to distinguish him from
ordinary men, at least ordinary men in their public presentations. Nothing
about the norms of ordinary male conduct is threatened by allowing these
women's accounts to be believed as revised. By finding safety in numbers,
women may be able to have their revised stories appear credible.
C. CorroboratingEvidence
Revised stories may also be believed when other evidence, preferably
physical evidence, corroborates the changed story. Corroboration
requirements may be formally gone in rape law, but their residue remains
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in the habits of belief. If a revised story is to be credible, it needs
something more than itself as proof.
For example, in Simmons v. State,121 the Indiana Supreme Court
upheld a rape conviction even though the victim told inconsistent
stories." Significantly, however, in both accounts she claimed she was
raped."z First, she said that she had been taken from the Payless
Supermarket to the Grandview Golf Course where she was raped.'24
Later, she said that she had been taken from the Anderson High School
parking lot to some nearby railroad tracks where she was raped." She
testified at trial that her statements were inconsistent because the defendant
forced her to "tell a different version of the incident that he furnished to
her."" With the introduction of expert testimony from a psychologist
and from a social worker to the effect that rape victims often feel under
the sway of a rapist even after he is no longer physically present," the
defendant was convicted of rape." But the experts did not accomplish
this extraordinary feat alone. It helped that the woman had never seen the
defendant before the attack, that she had been abducted with the
understanding that he had a gun, that he had threatened her with a knife
and a heavy pipe during the rape, and that the defendant also stole her
car. 12 But crucially, the police found the pipe with which the defendant
had allegedly threatened her in the grass by the train tracks. This was, in
short, a "real rape"" backed up with physical evidence of the pipe and
the stolen car.13 1 Her revised story did not stand alone.
When a revised account changes some of the elements of the initial
story that one would expect to remain invariant across descriptions, the
account generally becomes much less credible. In this case, the woman
originally said she left voluntarily from the Payless Supermarket parking
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

504 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1987).
See id. at 577-79, 582.
See id. at 578.
Id.
id.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 579.
See id. at 578-79.
Id. at 577, 582.
See id. at 577-78, 581.
ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 3.
See Simmons, 504 N.E.2d at 577, 581.
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lot,3 2 and then later said she was abducted from the Anderson High
School. 13 The "voluntarily left" and "abducted" descriptions can be
seen as two plausible interpretations of the same physical events, perhaps
relying on different interpretations of her mental state that may not have
been easily visible to others. But the Payless Supermarket parking lot was
nowhere near the Anderson High School, 1" and so those descriptions
seem flat-out irreconcilable, not just a matter of variable interpretation.
Had there been no further corroborating evidence, this inconsistency
would probably have been fatal to the credibility of the story.
Why is this? Often revisions of the latter type ("flat out") are used as
evidence for inconsistencies of the first type ("matter of interpretation").
When a witness reveals inconsistencies in parts of descriptions that are
usually matters of general agreement among observers (like where we are
physically located when something occurs), this is taken as evidence that
she must also be suspect in matters about which there would not
necessarily be general agreement among observers (like the mental state
of the speaker). Stories look suspiciously reconstructed when some facts
that generally produce similar descriptions across observers appear to have
been altered since the first account.
But much can be forgiven when physical evidence exists to back up
the later story. With corroborating evidence, narrative instability can be
"resolved" one way or another. Credibility of the lone woman may be
bolstered with some help from physical evidence but otherwise, women's
narratives are suspect when they change over time.
D. Expert Reconstructions
Sometimes a lone victim's changed story of sexualized abuse can
survive scrutiny, even without corroborating physical evidence. But not
without some assistance. In recent years, credibility of revised stories has
been established through the testimony of expert witnesses. These expert
witnesses generally testify that the victims of sexualized violence suffer
from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder and therefore have first
reactions, that are not to be trusted, allowing later accounts to be believed.
In State v. Frost,1 5 the expert testimony that was introduced made the
132. Id. at 578.
133. Id.
134. See id.

135. 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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victim's revised story credible to the jury, and later to the judges on

appeal.

1
3

Early one April morning in 1986, L.S. was still sleeping when her
former boyfriend, Gregory Frost, tapped on her shoulder.137 He had
broken into her house. 13" As she started to wake up, he started to yell
at her. He hit her.3' Their baby began to cry, so L.S. picked up the
child and ran to the front door to escape. 1" Before she was able to open
the door, Frost caught
up with her and cut her arm deeply with a razor141
edged box cutter.
The relationship between Frost and L.S. had been plagued -by Frost's
frequent outbursts of violence against L.S., and she estimated that he had
hit her at least once per month during the time they had been romantically
involved, starting on the second day that they knew each other.14 2 Police
testified that she had called them to the house at least nine times to stop
his violence.143 After suffering through three and a half years of
battering, L.S. had left Frost to go to live with her mother. She obtained
144
a restraining order to keep Frost away from her and the baby.
Eventually, Frost was sent to prison for theft from another person. L.S.
had been responsible for his arrest in that case and, on the day he broke
into her house and cut her with the razor, he had just been let out of
prison. His first act as a free man was revenge.
Knowing how out-of-control he could be, L.S. tried to talk with him,
eventually suggesting that they have sex because "that would calm him
down."' After they had sex, they went to the place where L.S.'s
mother worked to get her car keys to go to the hospital to have the wound
treated. L.S. asked her mother not to call the police. At the hospital, L.S.
said she had cut her arm on the refrigerator. Her arm needed four sutures
underneath the skii and eleven stitches to close the wound.
136. See id. at 1286-88.
137. Id. at 1284.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1285.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 1285.
145. Id. at 1284.
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After L.S. was treated, she, Frost, and the baby went to Frost's
mother's home to get money, and then went to a park where they drank
beer and talked together. Eventually, they went back to L.S.'s home
again. L.S. was supposed to pick her mother up at work, but never did.
When L.S.'s mother arrived, angry at having to find another ride home,
she and L.S. got into such a huge fight that neighbors called the police.
When the police arrived, they saw Frost running from the apartment
wearing no shoes, socks, or shirt. They recognized him as the person
against whom a restraining order had been issued, and they arrested
him.'4 They charged him with contempt of court for violating the
restraining order, as well as burglary for breaking into the house, assault
for stabbing L.S., and various weapons charges for possessing the
razor.1 47 Notably, he was not charged with rape. He was convicted on
all counts.14
At the trial, Frost had claimed that L.S. had consented to spend the
day with him, which he thought should cast doubt on any claim that he
had broken in and attacked her that morning. 49 After all, Frost argued,
why would this woman spend the whole day with him unless she wanted
to? To respond to this, prosecutors introduced expert testimony to the
effect that L.S. was suffering from Battered Woman's Syndrome, an
identifiable medical condition that was characterized by the court as
follows:
The battered woman places herself in the role of a victim. She
blames herself, thereby becoming even more vulnerable to the
point where she almost expects it. She is reluctant to tell anybody
about what occurs, usually for a variety of reasons. She may be
embarrassed, the man might keep her isolated from others, she
may hope the situation will change, or she may fear it will get
worse if she reports anything. Most significantly, the battered
woman cannot just walk away from the situation. She is
emotionally dependent on her "man" and is often involved in a
love-hate relationship. 150

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 1285.
See id. at 1284-85.
See id. at 1284.
See id. at 1285.
Id. at 1287.
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The effect of the expert testimony was to provide a context within

which a jury could believe that all the things L.S. said on the day of the
attack were motivated by fear. Such a fear-induced account could be
overridden by a revised story later. Without this expert testimony,
however, a jury might reasonably conclude, as Frost tried to argue, that
she was now trying to get Frost in trouble because they had had a falling
out after a pleasant day. After all, L.S. presented repeated and consistent
explanations on the day in question about how she was okay, how she had
simply cut herself on the refrigerator, and how no one should call the
police because she was fine."' But the specific violent history of the
relationship between Frost and L.S., as well as the use of expert
testimony, convinced the jury that Frost had committed these acts and that
L.S. had not consented. 52 On appeal, the admissibility of the expert
testimony so crucial to the prosecution's case was upheld.' 53
Expert testimony can be very helpful to women in these situations.
But it comes at a price. Such testimony is effective with jurors because it
gives them an explanation for a victim's conduct at the time in question
by saying she is suffering from a form of mental illness. The victim may
have thought things were going to get better; she may have thought he
loved her; she may have thought that she wanted to be with him. But she
was wrong, deluded, and not a good judge of these things at the time. As
a result, whatever she may have thought happened on the day in question
can be dismissed as the result of temporary mental incapacity. But this
sort of transformation from a credible first story to an even more credible
revised story is very hard to do without an expert. The expert allows a
woman's revised story to be believed, but at the cost of making her out
to be a woman who could not know her own mind.
In this case, L.S. apparently wanted Frost convicted for these crimes.
But she also visited him eleven times while he was awaiting trial back in
prison.' 54
V. THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH IN LAW

So, how do judges and juries know when they have found the truth?
It is an astonishing accomplishment that courts as well as ordinary
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 1284-85.
See id. at 1285-88.
See id. at 1288.
See id. at 1285.
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individuals manage to operate on a daily basis as if the bases of factual
judgments were clear and solid. While the idea of truth has been a
contested subject among philosophers for as long as philosophy has
existed, the idea of truth in daily life seems to generate much less debate.
When asked to find "the facts" of a case, judges and juries do not puzzle
over the meaning of that instruction. Why? The simple answer is that
judges and juries, spectators and litigants, ordinary folks in their daily
lives and specialists in creating knowledge, "know truth when they see it."
Within our own system of truth-finding, some cases may be easier and
others harder, but the idea of truth itself is rarely in doubt. If the truth is
unclear in a particular instance, default rules, like rules about burdens of
proof or about how certain one has to be to convict, are employed to settle
matters provisionally so that cases can be resolved with certainty.
American courts rely on the widespread facility of ordinary citizens
in reasonably workable practices of truth-finding. The jury system is
premised on the idea that citizens, selected to serve on juries, can listen
to the presentation of evidence and work out "what happened" independent
of any specialized knowledge of the law.155 Lawyers and trial judges
generally receive no special training in determining the credibility of
evidence or in discerning truth, and so they too often draw on socially
situated, unremarkable methods for determining "what happened." It is
generally assumed that anyone who is not connected with the parties to the
dispute and who does not have a special interest in the outcome of the case
can figure out what to believe from evidence presented in a trial without
specialized instruction. This is done because in the business of the
evaluation of evidence, almost everyone is thought to be enough of an
expert to be entrusted with finding facts.
But as we have seen with the examples explained above, truth-finding
is a socially situated practice. We all have a set of interpretive
conventions, practices of truth-finding, that tell us when a particular story
seems more credible than another and when one witness appears to be
telling the truth and another seems to be lying. Most of us engage in the
evaluation and construction of truth on a routine basis, finding the activity
generally nonproblematic and straightforward. Never mind that we are
often dead wrong in assessing credibility, regardless of our experience and
professional training. 1" Most of the time, we are successful enough or
155. See Scheppele, Facing Facts, supra note 9, at 42.
156. See BENNETrT & FELDMAN, supranote 9; Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan,
Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991).
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blind enough to the consequences of our inaccuracies not to reevaluate our
practices. Whenever our failures call attention to our inadequacies in this
regard, we engage in a patch-up effort to work out what went wrong in
the particular case, but we rarely rethink our entire scheme for evaluating
the evidence that daily life presents us. Furthermore, when we have to
deal with the law, whether as professionals who do this all the time, as
jurors or litigants who are called upon to do this on rare occasions, or
even as observers or scholars of the judicial process, we bring our
interpretive conventions with us.
So, what do people operating in the legal process see when they are
presented with evidence? What interpretive conventions do judges and
jurors invoke when called upon to figure out "the facts" of cases?
The attribution of truth by judges and juries depends on properties of
the stories witnesses tell.1" 7 Of course, this attribution goes on against
a backdrop of cultural expectations about what sorts of stories are credible
in the first place, and those expectations are dependent on visions of
normality and aberration, drawn from experience and from widely
available stock representations. But judges and juries decide whether a
witness is telling the truth by evaluating how the story isconstructed
rather than by working out whether the story has a "real" referent. Some
of the properties that matter in deciding whether stories are believable
include internal consistency, narrative coherence, reliance on "hard" or
physical evidence, and perhaps most importantly, the stability of the
storytelling over time.
Given that most people have a naive sense that language is supposed
to pick out things in the world, this view that the credibility of stories is
generally determined by reference to the internal properties of the stories
themselves may be disturbing. But it is not new. Clifford Geertz is one
teller of a tale that reports a cosmology in which the world rests on the
back of an elephant, which stands on the back of a turtle. When asked
what the turtle stands on, an informant answered, "[a]h, Sahib, after that
it is turtles all the way down." 58 This is not exactly a comforting
answer if one wants to believe that some bedrock exists somewhere. But
in stories, as with the elephant and its turtles, it is narrative all the way
down." -9 Narratives often become their own best evidence.
157. See BENNMr & FELDMAN, supranote 9, at ix.
158. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of
Culture, in THE INTERPRErATION OF CULTUREs 3, 29 (1973).
159. See JEROMEBRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 43 (1990) [hereinafter Acrs]; DAVID
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Much historical reconstruction, like the reconstruction in courts,
proceeds from narrative evidence. Historians most frequently work with
texts and they find themselves composing their own narratives to make
sense of the narratives they have encountered. Even those historians who
work with physical evidence, like archeological discoveries or other
tangible bits of a distant past, make sense of them by placing them in the
context of narratives. But saying that historical reconstructions are often
narratives "all the way down" is not to say that such reconstructions are
fictional. One can have a sense of faithfulness to the records and still be
constructing narratives of narratives of narratives as a record of "what
happened." Though it is notoriously difficult to draw any distinct
boundary between fictional and nonfictional narratives, one can credibly
claim to be constructing a narrative of evidence one has not invented out
of one's imagination. This is what passes for fact, both in historical
research and in courts of law.16°
Why is this? In courts of law, judges and juries cannot do what a
correspondence theory of language would have them do; they cannot hold
up testimony against events in the world to see which versions "match"
better. The most obvious reason for this is that the events are long over
before the cases come to trial and the "reality" in question is not around
to hold any descriptions up against, if such a thing could be done. Some
procedures would have to be devised for working out when a description
corresponds to reality and then those procedures, not the "matching,"
would be doing all the work. Most of the time, the traces left over from
historical events are accounts by people who were present at or otherwise
involved in the event, and such accounts-narratives-are often the best
evidence available.
Even if the descriptions were being constructed simultaneously with
events or if the events in question were preserved in some other form-as
happened in California v. Powell,"' in which a citizen's videotape
CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE, AND HIsToRY 4-5 (1986); TheodoreR. Sarbin, The Narrative
as a Root MetaphorforPsychology, in NARRATIVEPSYCHoLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE
OF HUMAN CONDUcr 3, 9 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986); Jerome Bruner, The

Narrative Constructionof Reality, 18

CRICAL INQUIRY

1, 5-6 (1991).

160. For an example of essays providing a range of views on the process of writing
history, with a particular focus on what cannot be asserted as true, see PROBING THE
LIMITs OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" (Saul Friedlander
ed., 1992) [hereinafter PROBING THE LIMrrs].
161. No. BA035498 (L.A., Cal. County Ct., Apr. 30, 1992) (unpublished opinion
of Judge Weisberg).
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recorded several Los Angeles police officers beating motorist Rodney
King-judges and jurors could not work out which single description best
"matched" the world. The whole idea of matching descriptions against the
world is misleading because, apart from being metaphorical, it assumes
that there is only one perspective, only one point of view, only one
ideology, no room for multiple readings, and no potential for
disagreement. In short, it assumes no problem with understanding how
accounts as socially situated cultural products relate to evidence of the
world. But particular "true" stories and particular descriptive statements
are often selected from among a set of arguably accurate versions of
reality -- it is just that other descriptions in the set give very different
impressions about what is going on. The vexing question is not just
whether the descriptions are accurate in some way, though it is crucially
important to screen out lies, but rather, how it is that some particular
description instead of some other description comes to be forwarded as the
authoritative version of events."6 This raises questions of power and
ideology, of the "situatedness" of the descriptions that pass for truth, and
of the social agendas they support.'
In law, these questions are not explicitly raised as problems, though
practitioners know that they are crucially important. Questions about
multiple versions of reality are largely ignored in the subject of evidence,
in which the greatest concerns are limits to the sorts of statements that
might be taken as accurate. Rules of evidence screen out types of
information that are thought to be misleading," prejudicial," non162. The exceptions to this generalization pose special problems for historians. See

Carlo Ginzburg, Just One Witness, in PROBING THE LUM1S, supra note 160, at 82.
163. See NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKINO 20, 97 (1978). In a more
distinctly legal context, see Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of
Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988).
164. See Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
Feminism and the Privilege ofPartial Perspective, in SIMIANS, CYBOROS, AND WOMEN:
THE m
~vENrioN
oF NATURE 188-89 (1991). For an account of the truthlideology
distinction in the history of Marxist thought, see MIcHmE BARRuiT, THE POLITICS OF
TRUTH: FROM MARX TO FOUCAULT (1991).
165. See FED. R.EVID. 801; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay,
87 HARv. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) (explaining that hearsay is excluded because of

inaccuracies attributed to ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous
memory).
166. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence in circumstances in which its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
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probative, 6 7 or just plain unreliable." s But the rules of evidence
themselves are at best probabilistic judgments about categories of
information and their likelihood of being false or irrelevant." Following
the rules of evidence is certainly no guarantee of finding truth, especially
because most of us frequently use legally excludable evidence in making
judgments outside of courtroom settings without apparently being wrong
much of the time and because legally admissible evidence may well be
unreliable. Rules of evidence proceed on the assumption that individualbits of information can be screened out as unreliable, misleading, or
untruthful and that any "reasonable" assemblage of what is left counts as
truth. But this is at best a hopeful fiction.
For one thing, rules of evidence provide no guidance about what to
do once particular bits of information are admitted as evidence. In
practice, judges and juries do the best they can to evaluate evidence the
only way they can-through assessing the way the stories hang together
with what else they know about the world and through spotting key
characteristics in the stories that they hear, characteristics they believe are
signs of truth. Judges and juries cannot do anything else. They have to use
ordinary conventions of truth-finding.
Given the dependence of law on these ordinary conventions of truthfinding, it is worth asking just what these ordinary conventions are, for
several reasons. First, the outcomes of individual cases are highly
dependent on what is found to be "the truth" in that instance, so the
integrity and reliability of the judicial process depends on these factual
determinations. How they are made and what conventions they invoke
should be made explicit if law is to be justifiable to those who are subject
to it.' Second, interpretations of fact and law are not easily separable
activities in the process of legal reasoning," and so any theory of
167. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding evidence that is not relevant).
168. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (defining hearsay as, inter alia, "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying [in court], offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted"; hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Rules
or the Supreme Court); see also Tribe, supra note 165, at 958 (explaining that hearsay
is excluded because of inaccuracies attributed to ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception,
and erroneous memory).
169. See generally 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 6.5 (Peter Tillers rev. vol. 1983) (arguing that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence did not consider whether the procedural techniques used to regulate the
presentation of evidence would be successful in achieving accuracy).
170. STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 50, 69-70 (1990).
171. See SCHEPELE, supranote 8, at 86-102 (detailing the interrelationship between
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judging needs to include some account of the interpretive conventions used
in the construction of facts to adequately represent the process. 172 Third,
law often pretends to be above politics, prejudice, and partiality by virtue
of the principled nature of its practices in judging. Insofar as a large part
of that practice depends on unexamined and possibly prejudicial
conventions for assessing the facts on which judicial judgment depends,
the practice of judging can hardly be said to be above these
"contaminating" influences. So, we should explore these influences before
relying on the assumption that law manages to sanitize bias through its
appeal to principle.
In addition to these worries about abstract legal legitimacies, a more
immediate practical issue is involved in working out whose conventions of
truth-finding are to be invoked when more than one set of conventions
applies in the social settings that a given legal system embraces. If we
have learned anything in recent years about the operation of social
practices, it is that they are usually specific to time, place, social location,
and embodiment in the lives of particular people. Saying that "we" have
a set of conventions for truth-finding begs the questions of who the "we"
are and whether "we" share these practices at all. 1" So, working out
how information is constituted as fact or, at the risk of creating an
unwieldy neologism, how information is "enfacted" requires both looking
at the way conventions of practice are historically, socially, and culturally
situated in the lives of particular people and asking whose truth is being
found when jurors and judges find it. But when we look more closely, we
see that the whole metaphor of "finding" rather than "constructing" the
truth relies on the assumption that truth is "out there" to be located rather
than constituted through the operation of social practices. This way of
talking about truth shows how the "facticity" of a truth-claim must be
presented as if it is compelled by the "external-ness" of its referent rather
than compelled or allowed by the agreement on conventions of
description.
interpreting facts and laws).

172. See id. at 103-04; see also Scheppele, Telling Stories, supra note 9, at 2080-83
(stating that the way people interpret what they see depends to a very large extent on
prior experiences, on the ways in which they organize their observations, and on patterns
of their daily life; this poses a particular problem in the law because judges and jurors
are not first-hand witnesses and can only weigh other people's perceptions).
173. See Scheppele, Telling Stories, supra note 9, at 2079 n.21.
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VI. EVALUATING REVISED STORIES

With these theoretical considerations in mind, we can now return to
the specific problem of revised stories. If judges and juries generally
believe that the first versions of stories are true and that later versions
must be suspect unless some special reason exists to distrust the earlier
version, what must their picture of truth look like? And how adequate is
this picture to the complicated world that judges and juries are trying to
represent through the construction of the facts of a case?
To believe initial versions over revised versions, people must have an
image of a precarious and fragile truth that decays over time or is subject
to the continual risk of subsequent distortion. As a result, information
gathered before these inevitable processes of decay and distortion set in is
considered to be especially important in figuring out "what happened." If
accounts seem to change over time, it must be because something other
than the initial, accurate perception of reality is being incorporated into the
story.
Some basis for this belief exists, as the work of Elizabeth Loftus on
eyewitness testimony makes clear. 74 People do revise their accounts
based on new information that insinuates itself into the original memory
as if this later information were part of the initial perception. But the
possibility of such reconstructions should not eliminate the possibility that
victims, particularly those who have been traumatized by the events for
which they now want to seek legal redress, may be reinterpreting their
experience in a new frame-one that in many ways is more adequate than
their initial self-blame and denial.
The distinction people make between initial stories and revised stories
obscures an important feature they both share. They are both narratives,
and as such, they both represent strategies for organizing and making
sense of evidence. 75 Neither story represents "perception without
conception." The first version of any story is not merely raw material,
processed by the mind without interpretation, that revised stories take and
then shape through interpretive processes absent in the first version itself.
As Wittgenstein showed in the duck-rabbit demonstration, "seeing"
initially is often "seeing as."176 We do not first see things "as they are"
174. See ELIzABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNEss TESTIMONY 70 (1979); ELIZABETH
F. LOFruS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992).
175. See AcTs, supra note 159, at 55-59.
176. LuDwia WrrrGENSTEIN, PHLOSOPmCAL INVESTIGATIONs 194-95 (G.E.M.
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and then interpret them. We see with the interpretive frameworks we bring
to events as much as we see with our eyes. When we change interpretive
frameworks, especially when the new frameworks create new accounts of
blame, others may see us as making things up.
For example, the woman who sees her abusive husband as revealing
his love for her through his violence is not processing raw material that
is then later interpreted through consciousness-raising. She is interpreting
her husband's actions as they are happening-and those initial
interpretations feel like untainted perception. But her initial perceptions are
already interpretations, though they would be different in their
organization from the perceptions of her husband's defense lawyer or a
feminist observer seeing those same events unfolding before their eyes.
The difference in accounts that the battered woman and the feminist
lawyer would give of this event is not the difference between truth and
falsehood. Instead, it is the difference in the interpretive framework
through which the events are seen in the first place.
Different versions of events may be related by different people
witnessing the same thing at the same time. For identical reasons, different
versions of events may be related by the same person who sees what once
happened in a new light that only switches on when some time has elapsed
since the event. But why should we favor the first framework that the
victim happens to have over another framework that might be brought to
bear on the event with more reflection?
The puzzle is deepened when we note that most people believe that
reflection aids accuracy in everything but reports of perception. Generally,
people believe that considered preferences are more reliable than
preferences listed off the top of one's mind."7 And ethical judgments
that have been weighed for a period of time are better than "snap
judgments." Even academic papers that have been through revisions are
considered better, more polished, than those that have not been through
the process of revision. Why is it, then, that reports of "facts" are not
similarly thought to be improved with reflection and thought?
We learn to describe first impressions as true because they appear to
involve no conscious alteration, even though there may be a physical basis
for other reports of those perceptions. Nelson Goodman reports that when
most of us report seeing a round table from the side, we still describe it
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1984).
177. In an earlier version of this paper, I called revised stories "considered stories"
to emphasize their connection with considered preferences.
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as round, even though our eyes are perceiving the shape as oval because
of the angle of vision. 178 Clearly, there is a large element of

construction, however rapid and implicit, even in the most apparently
uncontroversial descriptions.
What this all amounts to is that first accounts appear to be simply true
as if perception were somehow free of organizing concepts and categories
that are themselves social products. First versions are the "obvious" way
to describe what has happened, while revised versions seem to involve
conscious hard work to "make sense" of what has happened and are
therefore more obviously contestable. The accounts we take to be "simply
true" feel as though they are "straight" read-outs of unbiased perception.
The accounts we arrive at by revising our stories to "make sense" of
things seem to pull away from those initial perceptions and are
consequently distrusted.
But this contrast between a picture of pure and untainted perception
and an alternative picture of a contaminated, altered, or revised account
should now appear naive. If all narratives are constructions and all
descriptions are socially situated, making use of concepts and categories
that are made available through the cultural location one occupies, then
why should we favor the first framework that this particular narrator
happens to bring to the description of events? In the context of sexualized
violence, in which a victimized population of women has come to see such
abuse as a persistent feature of daily life, saying that initial stories are the
only believable accounts amounts to saying that a potential defendant's
guilt or liability rests on the defendant's choice of victim. Women who
have accepted continuing victimization with the resignation of self-blame
and denial can be abused without anyone being able to gainsay such
women's initial narratives of complicity. When women learn that they do
not have to put up with such treatment, however, they see their own pasts
differently. But such reconstructions are then discredited as lies.
This is a general problem in the believability of narratives. The
preference for first versions of stories looks like a neutral rule. But it falls
particularly hard on women. As this article has shown, experience, socialscience research, and observation of the legal process tell us that women
who are the victims of sexualized violence often need to take time to
understand what has happened to them. This is because women have
learned both to put up with sexualized violence as a feature of daily life
and to blame themselves for it as a first-pass explanation. Courts'
178. GOODMAN, supra note 163, at 92.
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exclusion of revised stories works disproportionately against women
because women are disproportionately the victims of a socialization that
masks the immediate recognition of sexualized abuse as abuse.
Overcoming the first reactions takes time-but it is precisely these delays
that courts generally suspect as evidence of lying. The first stories we tell
are not constructed in the absence of frameworks that help us to make
sense of what has happened; they are simply constructed with our most
uncritical frameworks-frameworks that may or may not be the ones we
would think best to invoke upon further reflection.
Women's initial reactions in sexually abusive situations may lead
others, particularly the men with whom they interact and those who judge
women's reactions in court, to conclude that women enjoy the abuse and
are encouraging the conduct. In a study of rape victims in Chicago, for
example, I was surprised to find out how many women reported that they
attempted to fight off their attackers by crying, by telling the rapists their
life stories, and by apparently agreeing to sex to lower the violence level
in the assault.'7 Each of several of the women in our sample of nearly
100 women said she began to tell the rapist, often a stranger, intimate
details of her life in the attempt to get him to see her as a human being.
If he saw her as a person, she thought, then he could not do this to her.
Many women reported crying and bargaining rather than punching and
screaming. Talking, crying, and bargaining very rarely worked, but
women viewed these strategies as aggressive attempts to defend themselves
while the rapists no doubt interpreted these reactions as a lack of
meaningful resistance. In the absense of bruises and scratches that come
with a physical struggle, these women often had great difficulty proving
their nonconsent in court. Their first reactions were constructed as initial
narratives of consent. As a surprising number of first reactions revealed
in this study of sexual-assault victims, women are afraid to stop being
polite, even when they are being attacked. This may be because women
learn to be concerned with maintaining relationships and keeping them
from breaking apart.1" But regardless of the source of these reactions,
they make women's later narratives of rape unbelievable.
In cases of sexual harassment, what victims seem to want most is for
the conduct to stop. They do not want to leave their jobs, to file formal
grievances, or to rip up their lives to avoid what was not their fault to
179. Unpublished study (on file with author).
180. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE 62-63 (1982).
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begin with."'1 Women often do not report sexual harassment, hoping it
will go away. 1 2 By the time they decide to fight it, it is too late. The
initial story that they were consenting, or at least not objecting, has
already stuck.
If we have a legal system that uses rules of evidence and principles
that are hostile to revised stories in judging truth, then women will

continue to be victims in court when they press cases of sexualized
violence. But the few revised stories that are currently accepted by courts
are not an unqualified good thing in empowering women." In the
absence of multiple complaining witnesses and physical corroborating
evidence, the revised stories that courts currently accept are generally the
versions urged by expert testimony, not just by the woman herself. But the
presence of experts may remove a woman's individuality and unique voice
by substituting a statistically derived average experience that women
typically share for the detailed, potentially idiosyncratic experiences each
of us has. What a woman gains in solidarity with other women as a result
of being lumped into the averages, she may lose in distinctiveness if her
own experience veers from the statistical norm. As the women's
movement succeeds in breaking women free from a single conception of
femininity, such statistical averages will become less and less accurate as
descriptions of particular women's experiences. The reliance on expert
witnesses is immensely useful as a transition device between the world
today and a world in which women's stories have more power as a source
of fact. In the future, however, reliance on such witnesses may be seen as
urging another single oppressive image of how women should react to
sexualized violence on women who have diverse experiences and diverse
reactions.
The use of expert testimony currently allows a woman to win a case
against a man by having a "qualified person" testify that she was suffering
from trauma or delusion and thus was not in her right mind when she
blamed herself, acted from numbness like nothing had happened, tried to
181. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal
Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 51 (1990) (stating that women often quit jobs,
request transfers, and even request demotions as a result of sexual harassment in their
work environment).
182. See Mango, supra note 13, at 359-60.
183. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's
Sef-Defense Work and the Problem ofExpert Testimony on Battering, 9 WoMEN's RTS.
L. REP. 195 (1986) (arguing, in part, that the "battered woman syndrome" defense, as
told through expert testimony, often perpetuates gender stereotypes of female incapacity).
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show her deluded love for her attacker, or changed her story. What she
really meant (only the expert can say) was something else. Certifying the
later stories, experts succeed in establishing their own credibility while
establishing that women are individually unstable at the time of abuse.
Such psychologizing of the problem avoids recognition of the scale and
scope of sexualized violence against women. Understanding the narrative
strategies of women as the result of social and cultural forces larger than
the individual case, as this article has tried to do, reempowers women to
talk in their own voices and not just through the voices of experts.
Not all revised stories should be believed. Nor should all first drafts
of accounts be immediately accepted either. Strategies of belief need to be
more complicated than that to do justice to the variety of knowledges
present in any given society. Understanding how the stories are socially
constituted as believable in the first place is one important step in the
process of making the legal system a force for the liberation of women
from sexualized violence. At a minimum, fact-finders need to understand
that early narratives about sexualized violence may reveal not some deeper
truth, but rather the effects of oppression on women. Not allowing women
to reinterpret their own experiences as they learn to oppose the abuse is
a way of furthering that oppression.

